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1 Introduction
In this paper, we explore how the different costs of conflict determine the size and shape of territory. We
develop a model that provides a microfoundation for the classic “loss-of-strength gradient” introduced
by Boulding (1962), in which the ability to project power decreases with distance. Under the model, the
cost structure associated with entering and engaging in conflict at a distance determines the scope of ter-
ritory, with parameters determining whether and to what extent each location is contested or controlled
by a single actor. We then take the model to the laboratory, where we conduct two sets of experiments.
We first test the predictions of the theory directly under the conditions specified in the model, then subse-
quently under conditions of Knightian uncertainty about the underlying conflict technology. The first set
of experiments allows us to test equilibrium and comparative static predictions of the theory. The second
set of experiments probes the boundaries of the theory by allowing us to observe conflict behavior when
the precise nature of the incentives for conflict are not fully known to the contestants (as in conflicts out-
side the lab). Behavior is strikingly consistent with the predictions of the theory under both information
conditions.
Outside of economics, territory is a central concept in the academic study of conflict. In political sci-
ence, anthropology, and biology, a large literature is devoted to understanding the nature and scope of
territory (Mitani et al., 2010; VanValkenburgh and Osborne, 2012; Vasquez, 2012; Toft, 2014; Johnson
and Toft, 2014; Glowacki et al., 2017; Bonadonna et al., 2017). Yet territory has been understudied by
the economic literature on conflict.1 This is surprising not only because much conflict is territorial, but
also because economic factors are thought to be a fundamental cause of territorial conflict, and economic
reasoning is often implicitly employed to explain territorial extent. It is all the more surprising since the
basic relationship between territory and the projection of power at a distance was laid out by economists
long ago (Boulding, 1962; Tullock, 1983).
In Boulding’s theory, which is reminiscent of Hotelling’s (1929) theory of spatial competition, contes-
tants each have a “base" located at some point in space (e.g. at points along a line, see Figure 1). The
“power" or conflict capacity of an agent is represented graphically by the height of the bar at their base.
Contestants project power from their base, with their capacity to project power diminishing with distance.
Boulding’s model defines territorial boundaries as the point in space where the power of contestant A is
equal to the power of contestant B, i.e. point E in the figure. To the left of E, we have A’s territory, and
to the right of E, we have B’s territory. This framework has intuitive appeal, and yet to our knowledge
no one has yet provided a microfoundation for Boulding’s model. Thus the primary contribution of our
1(See e.g. Findlay and Lundahl, 2016) who states “While the study of frontiers has a place in the fields of history,
geography, and political science, it has been almost completely ignored in economics.” Thus, “an important goal for future
studies is to link mechanistic models of boundary formation with the cost-benefit approach.” (Adams, 2001).
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model is to reinvigorate the study of territory in economics by microfounding and extending the intuitive
theory introduced by Boulding (1962).
Figure 1: Boulding’s Model of Territory
Like Boulding’s, our model is explicitly spatial, so that geographic constraints and variation are allowed
to play a role in determining the distribution of conflict and territory. Failure to account for the spatial
element in conflict has been identified as a major gap in conflict theory by economists (Kimbrough et al.,
2017), biologists (Rusch and Gavrilets, 2017) and political scientists (Hansel in Vasquez, 2012, p. 22).2
One exception is the literature on Blotto Games, which analyzes constrained troop allocation across
spatially distinct battlefields (Kovenock and Roberson, 2012). Since the complexity of these games has
prevented intuitive predictions about territory, our approach starts with a simple (Tullock) objective func-
tion widely used in conflict theory.3 Agents compete in contests for resources that are located at points in
space. We introduce spatial variation via “the great principle of the further the weaker” (Boulding, 1962)
in order to generate simple comparative statics for the distribution of conflict and territory. We then gen-
eralize this model both analytically and experimentally, showing analytically how analogous predictions
arise under general contest success functions and richer geographies and showing experimentally that
the model organizes observed behavior under the conditions of the theory and under boundary condi-
tions more similar to those in which conflicts occur outside the lab.
2For instance, even though the famous hawk-dove game was designed with the study of territory in mind (Smith and
Price, 1973) it is non-spatial. Rusch and Gavrilets (2017), in his review of biological contests, argues that “Although many
of the models reviewed [...] identify territory as the resource most likely to be contested, it has rarely been taken into account
explicitly”.
3A second exception is the computational literature on spatial conflict/cooperation (e.g. Nowak et al., 1994; Ifti et al.,
2004; Szabó and Szolnoki, 2009) which models the evolutionary fitness of various strategy types among many agents inter-
acting in space (e.g. via an approach based in cellular automata). In these models, space usually plays a role in shaping which
agents interact with one another and thus what selection pressures are faced by which strategies. Territory is defined, if at all,
ostensively, as a region in which a single kind of agent predominates.
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Our paper also contributes to the literature in political economy on the formation of states. Most defi-
nitions of the state encompass some notion of a territorial monopoly of violence (Weber, 1965; Barzel,
2002; Abramson, 2017).4 Yet the presence of such a “monopoly” and the boundaries of such a “territory”
are often taken as given. Our theory helps delineate conditions under which monopolies of violence will
(and will not) emerge across space and thus provides theoretical foundations for the presence of one
crucial condition for the formation of states.
This last point highlights another key contribution of our model: the size of territories and the presence
(or absence) of monopolies on violence in each area are equilibrium outcomes rather than assumptions
or simple choice variables. The idea that roving-bandits may eventually opt to become stationary and
thereby take on the functions of states is broadly accepted (Olson, 2000; De La Sierra, 2018), yet it
misses essential features about territory: territory is not exogenous (Agnew, 1994) and whether there are
monopolistic outcomes or not depends on the entry decisions of multiple actors. To address this issue, we
build on the literature on asymmetric conflict (Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2015; Olszewski and Siegel, 2016)
and conflict entry (Morgan et al., 2012; Fu et al., 2015). In particular, we build on the asymmetric fixed-
cost setup of Ritz (2008) by incorporating the decisions of the marginal contestant into the equilibrium
calculation. In our framework, a defined territory and the number of competitors therein are equilibrium
outcomes. Under some cost structures, there are territories held by a monopolist, under others, all ter-
ritories are contested, and under others still, some territories are neither held nor contested by anyone.5
By endogenizing the presence and extent of territorial monopolies on violence, our model better coheres
with historical evidence suggesting that such exclusive monopolies are a special case.6
As noted above, the basis for our model comes from the landmark book by Boulding (1962). While this
led to a few scattered articles on this topic, we are aware of only two closely related models.7 Baker
4Abramson (2017) defines states as “organizations that maintain a quasi-monopoly of violence over a fixed territory.”
Weber (1965) defines the state as the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. (Barzel,
2002, p. 22) argues “The state consists of ... a territory where these individuals reside, demarcated by the reach of the
enforcer’s power”. This is reflected even in the dictionary definition of territory as “a geographic area belonging to or under
the jurisdiction of a governmental authority ” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/territory.
5We build on a burgeoning economics literature incorporating geography into both empirical and theoretical models of
political violence (Berman and Couttenier, 2015; Dow et al., 2017; Adamson, 2018). But this paper also has ties to industrial
organization - in particular, to the literature on local monopoly (Maskin and Tirole, 1988). In our model, exclusive territories
are non-cooperative equilibria leading to profit between monopolistic and 0-profit extremes.
6For example, the geographic extent of political territories, and number of competitors within those territories, were
variable throughout European history (Branch, 2014). Parker (2012) argues “imperial domains should not be seen as bounded
by static impervious borders. The margins of empires are better characterized as porous frontier zones.”. A globally recurring
example is the enlargement of territories after the introduction of new transport technology - e.g. the horse, ocean-going
ships.
7Hirshleifer (1991a) noted at the end of a book chapter that “in the simplest case an equilibrium is achieved at a geographic
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(2003) uses a 6 stage Stackelberg game to model how much of a territorial endowment a group would
opt to protect and predicts when we might see “geographically stable territories” or “home-ranges”.
Similarly, Anderson and McChesney (1994) model spatial conflict over land, but without considering
strategic interaction or cost variation. Our model combines the best of both these frameworks: a sin-
gle stage game that endogenizes the size of territories using the framework of conflict theory (Tullock,
1974) while incorporating ideas from economic geography about regional patterns (Krugman, 1991) and
boundaries (Spolaore, 2012). While the traditional approach to conflict entry emphasized the influence of
attributes (e.g. the shape) of the contest-success function (Hirshleifer, 1991b; Skaperdas, 1992; Skaper-
das and Jia, 2012), our cost-side approach is better suited to explain why the same contestants will fight
in some regions but not others. This approach matches a historical literature that emphasizes the costs
of projecting power and economies of scale in violence in political developments (Latzko, 1993; Herbst,
2000).8 We formalize this approach to predict where regions of peace and war will exist.
Finally, our experiments provide a direct test/illustration of our model and a boundary test of the theory
under conditions analogous to those faced by conflict actors outside the lab. This latter aspect of our
design builds on work since Smith (1962, 1982) that examines the behavior of subjects under realistic
but hard to model scenarios. Since conflict generally occurs behind a veil of radical uncertainty about its
prospects, we conduct half of our sessions without giving subjects any information about the form of the
contest success function faced in each conflict. Military philosophers and practitioners of all ages have
expressed little sense of a contest-success function, but rather a genuine sense of Knightian uncertainty
about conflict.9 Models of Knightian uncertainty are difficult to formulate, but it is straightforward to
construct experimental environments in which such uncertainty is inherent. Experiments like these can
provide evidence on the extent to which people learn about and respond to underlying incentives for
conflict in a world of uncertainty. Moreover, since we see that the theory successfully organizes our data,
despite subjects’ radical uncertainty about the environment, we can be more confident in the applica-
bility of our model and its implication that territory and conflict should be conceived of as equilibrium
outcomes of an underlying spatial game.
boundary”. Caselli et al. (2015) created a model where “two countries play a game with two possible outcomes: war and
peace” and the likelihood of war depends on the distance to a natural resource.
8Herbst (2000), much like Boulding, depicts pre-colonial African states as centers of power that radiate outwards. (Herbst,
2000, p .56) explains the reason for that shape being due to “the immediate fixed cost facing any leader who wished to extend
authority were thus extremely high ... As a result, beyond the political core, power tended to diminish over distance.”
9In fact, Keynes used the example of war to motivate the very idea of a non-defined probability distribution, and contests
were a big part of Knight’s thinking. Keynes (1937) states “The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the
prospect of a European war is uncertain . . . About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable
probability whatever. We simply do not know.”. Knight (1997 (1935) states “The activity which we call economic, whether
of production or of consumption or of the two together, is also, if we look below the surface, to be interpreted largely by the
motives of the competitive contest of game, rather than those of the mechanical utility functions to be maximized”.
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The experiments also speak to two other literatures in experimental economics: spatial game-theory
(Kirchkamp and Nagel, 2007; Grujic´ et al., 2014) and the economics of conflict (Carter and Anderton,
2001; Duffy and Kim, 2005; Powell and Wilson, 2008). While experiments testing spatial game theory
have explored to what extent patterns of behavior in Prisoners Dilemma experiments match the emergent
distribution of agent types in simulations, our experiment focuses on the how cost structures incentivize
territory formation. As for the literature on conflict experiments (see e.g. Dechenaux et al., 2015), it
is vast, but the introduction of an explicit model of geography to a multi-battle contest represents an
innovation within the prevailing framework.
2 Theory
A finite number of I players are located at fixed locations on a plane and can compete to obtain valuable
resources at every location. Each player can put forth effort at a location to obtain a share of the re-
source. There are fixed costs to enter, as well as marginal costs of effort. Effort costs are higher at more
distant locations, so different players will have different effort costs at each location; some will have a
cost-advantage and others will have a cost dis-advantage. Each player’s willingness to enter into conflict
at a location is determined by the spatial gradient of costs and benefits.
Territory emerges when there is only one entrant over a set of locations. This happens when there are
both asymmetric marginal costs and high entry costs. The reason is that players with higher effort costs
earn lower profits, and lower profit players prefer to exit with high entry costs. While other patterns
result from alternative cost structures, we focus on this territorial outcome.10 We describe the general
solution but focus most of our discussion on a two-player Tullock contest success function setting (the
setup we use in our experiments) to develop intuition about when territory emerges.
2.1 Setup: Micro Motives
Consider player i based at location `i and considering conflict at location `. Each location has resources
Y , which could in principle vary across locations, but which we treat as fixed below. Denote ei(`) as the
effort from i exerted in the conflict at location `. The share of resources obtained by i at ` is Pi(`), which
is an implicit function of all efforts; Pi = e
i
E i+ei . Note E
i(`) = ∑k 6=i ek(`) is the sum of others’ conflict
efforts and n(`) is the total number players expending effort at that location. There is a constant marginal
cost at each location ci(`), but this cost is weakly increasing with the distance from i’s base di(`,`i).
10Whenever profits net of entry costs are positive for both players, both enter the conflict and exert effort equal to (8). With
very high fixed costs, profits net of entry costs are always negative for both players creating a “de-militarized zone”. With
moderate fixed costs, there are multiple equilibria with one entrant. That case is a generalization of the case where fixed costs
are low enough so that one player always has positive profit when players are best responding on the intensive margins.
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There is also a fixed cost K at each location; this, too, could vary in principle, but we treat it as fixed. So
i’s profit at a given location is:
Πi(`) = Y Pi(`)− ci(`)ei(`)−K (1)
Player i allocates effort at each location to maximize profit:
max
ei(`)
∫
Πi(`)d` (2)
The optimum at each location depends on E i(`), and the across-individual average of marginal effort
costs, c(`) = 1n(`)∑k c
k(`). Denoting ε as the resource-share elasticity with respect to effort, which
implicitly depends on all efforts, we can write the first order condition for effort as:
ei(`) = ε i(`)
Y Pi(`)
ci(`)
(3)
For there to be regions with only one contestant (i.e. for there to be territory), one player must always
choose to enter while others must not. In the presence of fixed costs of entry, conflict earnings must at
least cover entry costs, or a player will prefer to exit. When entry is not a dominant strategy, some effort
and entry probability will render players indifferent between entering and exiting. The 0−profit equation
for player i implies
ei(`) =
Y Pi(`)−K
ci(`)
(4)
Thus, we can solve for the equilibrium probability that territory emerges over a set of locations. In
Appendix A.1 we show graphically how the microfoundations provided here can aggregate to model
territory without specifying any functional forms, a lá Boulding. Given specific functional forms, this
problem can be solved numerically with non-linear optimization techniques, but in what follows we
simplify and employ the widely used Tullock contest success function. This allows us to find closed-
form solutions and is the simplest setup that shows how the costs of projecting power and economies of
scale in the production of violence affect territory.
2.2 Asymmetric Players with Tullock Form
First consider a Lemma pertaining to Tullock contests generally. By adding a 0 to Ω= ∑k ek
Ω = ∑
k
(
ek +Ek
)
−∑
k
Ek = nΩ−∑
k
Ek =
1
n−1∑k
Ek (5)
Then note the first order conditions for the intensive margins at a specific location (equation 3) with
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Tullock form yields
E i(`) =Ω(`)2
ci(`)
Y
(6)
Combining equations 5 and 6 gives
Ω(`) =
1
n(`)−1∑k
(
Ω(`)2
ck(`)
Y
)
=
1
n(`)−1
Ω(`)2
Y
n(`)c(`) =
n(`)−1
n(`)
Y
c(`)
(7)
Equation 8, which provides equilibrium efforts when all players are at an interior solution, is found by
substituting equation 7 into 6, so that
E i(`) =
(
n(`)−1
n(`)
)2 ci(`)
c(`)
2Y (8)
Applying the same logic for all i = 1, ...,n(`) creates a linear system of n(`) equations and n(`) un-
knowns, which is uniquely solved for in Appendix Section A.2. Since c
i(`)
c(`)
2 follows a spatial gradient
determined by distance from base, di(`,`i), spatial patterns of profit and effort result. A simple example
for 3 players over 2 dimensions in which all players are at an interior solution at all locations is shown
in Appendix Section A.3. The example highlights how cost asymmetries shape the spatial distribution
of conflict efforts, when players enter conflict. However, territory can emerge under conditions in which
not all players want to enter the conflict.
As noted above, when fixed costs are high, entry may not be a dominant strategy since a cost-disadvantaged
player may earn a negative profit at the interior solution (equation 10), and would prefer to exit. How-
ever, in that case, remaining players would have incentive to reduce their efforts. But if they lower effort
too much, the cost-disadvantaged player who found it in their interest to exit before would instead have
a best response to enter and exert positive effort. At that point, the reduced efforts of the cost-advantaged
players are not best-responses. Consider when the cost-disadvantaged player i is indifferent between
entering and not. Equations 4 and 3 combine to imply the following.11
11For Tullock, it is easier to use rearrangements of equations 3 and 4. Plugging equation 3 into 4 to solve for ε i implies
that Pi(`)(1−ε i(`)) = K/Y and plugging back into equation 3 implies ei(`) =
(
ε i(`)
1−ε i(`)
)
K
ci(`) . Note the Tullock form implies
ε i = E
i
E i+ei and
ε i
1−ε i =
E i
ei . Then plug those elasticity terms into those equations and solve.
7
ei(`) =
√
Y −√K√
ci(`)
√
K√
ci(`)
E i(`) =
(√
Y −√K√
ci(`)
)2
(9)
For territory to emerge, it must be the case that only one player enters with certainty. When there is a
marginal player left after all higher cost players have exited, as in Hirshleifer (1995) and Ritz (2008),
the decisions of the second lowest cost player are what matters for territory.12 Thus, we further simplify
by focusing on the 2 player case. This 2 player case provides intuition for how the costs of projecting
power at a distance combine with economies of scale in the production of violence to affect territory, and
it corresponds to the setup of our experiments.
2.3 Nash Equilibrium for Two Player Tullock
For two players, the intensive equation (8) simplifies to
ei(`) =
c−i(`)
c(`)
2
Y
4
(10)
Equilibrium resource shares are Pi(`) = c
−i(`)
2c(`)
. These equations characterize equilibrium completely in
the cases in which both players have a pure strategy to enter and expend effort at all locations. However,
changes in either fixed costs or marginal effort costs can cause the equilibrium to switch from one in
which both players have a pure-strategy to enter to one in which a cost-advantaged player has a pure
strategy to enter and a cost-disadvantaged player has a mixed-strategy. The mixed strategy equilibrium
occurs where the cost-disadvantaged player is indifferent between exiting and entering, but enters with a
probability such that the cost advantaged player does not want to deviate.
The extensive equations (9) simplify to
ei(`) =
√
Y −√K√
ci(`)
√
K√
ci(`)
e−i(`) =
(√
Y −√K√
ci(`)
)2
(11)
12Delineating all strategic interactions for N players is cumbersome and will muddy the point we wish to make about
the creation of territory. It’s left for future work to explore the case of multiple cost-disadvantaged players on the extensive
margins.
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To compute equilibrium values, denote e−i(`) as the cost-advantaged players’ effort at the indifference
point for the cost-disadvantaged player. Probabilistic combinations of ei(`) and exit are a best-response
to e−i(`). Denote the probability σ i(`), as the equilibrium probability of enter in this 2−point mixed
strategy. We find σ i(`) when e−i(`) is a best-response to ei(`) with probability σ i(`). Maximizing
E
[
Π−i
]
= (1−σ i(`))Y +σ i(`)Y P−i(`)− c−i(`)e−i(`)−K (12)
has the first order conditions in equation 6 but with σ i(`)Y instead of Y . Specifically
E−i =
(E−i + e−i)2
Yσ i
⇒ σ i =
(
e−i
ei
+1
)
c−ie−i
Y
. (13)
Substituting equations 11 into 13 and solving yields
σ i(`) =
(
c−i(`)
ci(`)
)(√
Y −√K√
K
)
(14)
This shows the main comparative statics: as the fixed costs shrink or the other person’s relative costs rise,
probability of entry increases. Diminishing costs of projecting power are shown by c
−i
ci(`) → 1. Increasing
economies of scale in the production of violence are shown by
√
Y−√K√
K
↓. What is most important
for territorial outcomes is how these terms interact. Each term multiplies the other in the cumulative
probability of territory in region R;
∫
Rσ i(`)d`.
2.4 Numerical Example
A numerical example illustrates how the extensive and intensive margins change with distance from a
base due to the changing cost asymmetries with high and low fixed costs. Consider two symmetric
players, L and R, competing over 3 locations: Location 1 at base L, Location 3 half way between base
L and base R, and Location 2 half way between location 1 and Location 3. The marginal costs of
effort at each location are (cL,cR) = {(3,15),(6,12),(9,9)} which changes the cost-asymmetry but not
c. The fixed costs are either K = 350 or K = 10. Figure 2 shows how the combination of fixed costs
and marginal costs change the best responses and the equilibrium. At locations 1 and 2, we have a
mixed strategy equilibrium in which L always enters the conflict and exerts effort sufficient to make R
indifferent between entry and exit. The mixed strategy equilibrium in equation (14) can be visualized
where the dashed red-lines intersect the solid-blue lines (although there will be small differences because
P is a non-linear function which creates a difference between expected utility and utility of expected
values). At location 3, both players always enter and expend effort in equilibrium. This is the simplest
exposition of the non-linear and interacting effects of how the cost of projecting power and economies
of scale in the production of violence affect conflict decisions at the micro level. This is the benefit and
9
cost structure we employ in the experiment.
Figure 2: Best Response Example
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
eR
e
L
l
ll
Location 1
l
l
Fixed Cost
10
350
Marg. Costs (3,15)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
eR
e
L
l
ll
Location 2
l
l
Fixed Cost
10
350
Marg. Costs (6,12)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
eR
e
L l
Location 3
l
l
Fixed Cost
10
350
Marg. Costs (9,9)
3 Experimental Design
We design a laboratory experiment to test the point and comparative static predictions of the theory
directly. In our experiment two contestants are arranged along a line segment, on which there are 5 bat-
tlefields, each containing a resource worth 2000 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), at equally spaced
intervals. At each battlefield, the contestants must decide whether to incur a fixed cost of entering the
battle, and if so, how much costly effort to expend at that battlefield. The contestants each have a “base"
at the battlefields at the ends of the line segment. We define two player types “L" and “R", with Player L
being assigned a base on the leftmost battlefield and Player R being assigned to the rightmost battlefield.
They can project their power out from that base by paying a fixed cost of entry (which, within a treatment
is constant across battlefields) and a variable cost of conflict effort, which increases linearly with distance
in our design.
Conflicts at each battlefield are realized via a Tullock contest success function. Contestants receive their
expected conflict winnings, minus any fixed or variable costs incurred at each battlefield. Our treatments
hold fixed the linear function defining the variable cost of conflict (specifically each unit of effort costs
3ECU × (1 + d), where d is the distance of the battlefield from the subject’s base), and instead we
vary the fixed costs of entry from Low (10ECU) to High (350ECU). In one treatment (Low), the
equilibrium outcome involves conflict at all 5 battlefields, with no clearly defined territory, and in the
other treatment (High), we observe more clearly defined territories, with both players always fighting at
only the central battlefield in equilibrium. Table 1 displays the fixed cost parameters and the resulting
equilibrium entry/effort decisions for each treatment.
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Table 1: Equilibrium Predictions
Player Value Fixed Cost Effort (Entry-Prob.) Profits
Loc1 Loc2 Loc3 Loc4 Loc5
L 2000 10 93 (1.00) 74 (1.00) 56 (1.00) 37 (1.00) 19 (1.00) 3006
R 2000 10 19 (1.00) 37 (1.00) 56 (1.00) 74 (1.00) 93 (1.00) 3006
L 2000 350 45 (1.00) 56 (1.00) 56 (1.00) 41 (0.70) 32 (0.28) 1303
R 2000 350 32 (0.28) 41 (0.70) 56 (1.00) 56 (1.00) 45 (1.00) 1303
In the High treatment, the subject interface was as shown in Figure 3 (the Low treatment was presented in
the same manner). The hypothetical player in the Figure is making decisions consistent with equilibrium
from the perspective of Player L. Subjects first chose via a check box whether to Enter the “competition"
at each “location" (aka battlefield) and then, conditional on entry, how much effort to expend. Effort
costs were chosen via a slider, and the projected variable cost updated in real time as a subject moved the
slider. On the right side of the screen, a heat map shows the payoff consequences associated with each
combination of Player L and Player R actions; subjects could use tabs to toggle the heat map for each
battlefield. At the end of each period, subjects were also provided complete information about their own
and their opponent’s strategy as well as the associated own payoff. This was stored as a scrollable list so
that subjects could refer back to previous experience when making decisions in subsequent periods. By
design, subjects had all the information required to compute the equilibrium entry and effort decisions.
These treatments allow us to test whether subject behavior corresponds to the equilibrium.
3.1 Adding Realism: Uncertainty and Repeat-Interaction
To explore the boundaries of the theory, we conduct two additional treatments designed to capture im-
portant dimensions of conflict in field settings: Knightian uncertainty about conflict with non-random
neighbors. Specifically, the second set of treatments differ in both the matching protocol and the in-
formation provided to subjects. First, instead of random rematching, these treatments employ partner
matching since most territorial conflict arises repeatedly among neighbors. Second, the Uncertain-Low
and Uncertain-High treatments introduce Knightian uncertainty, such that subjects remain uninformed
about both the form of the contest success function and the heat map of possible payoffs. This uncertainty
also reflects a fundamental feature of most conflicts.13 Subjects are informed of the cost structure and of
the fact that their share of the resource value from a conflict is increasing in their own effort and decreas-
ing in their opponent’s effort. Otherwise, they are provided no information about how conflict outcomes
are generated. Like subjects in the Low and High treatments, they observe their counterpart’s strategies
13E.g. Mao Zedongs theory on protracted war states “the peculiar nature of war makes it impossible in many cases to
have full knowledge about both sides; hence the uncertainty about military conditions and operations, and hence mistakes and
defeats.” (Tse-Tung, 2011).
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Figure 3: Subject Interface
and outcomes at each battlefield in each round, but this is their only source of information about conflict
outcomes. These treatments allow us to test whether subjects learn to respond to the incentives provided
by the conflict environment, despite operating under uncertainty. That is, does the equilibrium of the
underlying game organize the data, even when the information conditions required for the achievement
of equilibrium are not met?
3.2 Procedures
For each session, we recruited 18 subjects to the lab at random from the subject pool of the Economic
Science Institute Laboratory at Chapman University. No subject had any experience in a prior contest
experiment, and no subject participated in our experiment more than once. Half of the subjects were
assigned the role of player L and half the role of player R, and these roles remained constant throughout
a session. Subjects began the experiment in either the High or Low treatment, and we performed 16 static
12
repetitions of the conflict game, randomly rematching subjects between rounds. After 16 repetitions, we
announced (unbeknownst to the subjects) that the fixed costs had changed and that the conflict game
would continue for an additional 16 repetitions. Across sessions we randomized whether subjects first
experienced the High or Low treatment, so that we can identify treatment effects using both between and
within-subject treatment variation in fixed costs. The amount of information and pairing procedure was
held constant within subject but varied between subjects. Each treatment block had 2 sessions beginning
with Low and 2 sessions beginning with High. The entire design is summarized by Table 2.
Table 2: Experimental Design: Sessions × Individuals
Fixed Costs
350→ 10 10→ 350
Random Matching, Full Info 2×18 2×18
Partner Matching, Knightian 2×18 2×18
Subjects received paper copies of the instructions, and these were also read aloud. At the conclusion
of the instructions, we conducted a single guided practice round to familiarize subjects with the experi-
mental interface and then subjects completed a second, self-paced practice round. The experiment began
when no subjects had additional questions. After the first 16 periods, an announcement about the change
in cost parameters was made orally. See Appendix B for a copy of the full instructions and the script for
the practice period and oral announcements.
Subjects were paid their earnings from a single period, drawn at random at the end of the experiment.
We converted ECU to dollars at a rate of 200 ECU = $1. To eliminate bankruptcy risk and ensure payoff
salience, subjects’ payoffs included a $10 endowment. We added the earnings from the randomly chosen
period (which could be positive or negative) to the endowment and the lab-standard $7 payment for
arriving on time. Subjects earned $30 for a two hour session on average, with payoffs ranging from
(min= $14.75, max= $61.75).
4 Experimental Findings
4.1 Entry and Effort Under Full-Info and Random Matching
We begin with an analysis of entry decisions in the baseline treatments, High and Low, which provide
subjects full information and employ random matching. Figure 4 displays conflict entry probabilities
by treatment for each battlefield over the final 5 periods of each treatment condition (i.e. we focus on
behavior after subjects have gained substantial experience with the environment). Since the game is
13
symmetric, we pool the data for the left and right players, showing entry probabilities as a function of the
marginal cost of conflict effort. Recall that in the Low treatment, when entry costs are small, the model
predicts always enter at all 5 battlefields by both players, and in the High treatment, when entry costs are
large, the model predicts always enter only at the 3 battlefields with the lowest marginal costs of conflict.
While the data clearly reject these point predictions (e.g. there is too little entry in the Low treatment,
relative to theory, and both too little and too much entry, depending on the case in the High treatment),
we see support for the comparative static prediction that there will be more conflict entry in the Low
treatment than in the High treatment. Entry at a battlefield by only one subject reflects the creation of
territory, suggesting that territory emerges more often, as predicted, when entry costs are high.
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Figure 4: Probability of conflict entry, by treatment and effort cost under full information and
random matching.
We provide statistical support for the foregoing observations via linear probability estimates with subject
fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the subject level.14 Thus the treatment effects
are identified from within-subject variation. The dependent variable measures entry decisions. It takes
a value of 1 if a subject chose to enter conflict at a given location and 0 otherwise. The independent
variables include dummies for the marginal cost of conflict at the location, a High fixed cost treatment
dummy, and the full set of interactions. The intercept captures the entry probability at the location with
marginal cost of conflict = 3 in the Low fixed cost treatment. We use data from the final 5 periods of
each treatment, so our sample consists of 72 subjects, each of whom makes 5 entry decisions (one for
each location) in each of 10 periods (5 per treatment).15 Estimates are reported in column (1) of Table 3.
14Results are qualitatively unchanged if we instead cluster standard errors at the session level.
15To see the entire effort distribution over all periods, see Appendix Section C.1. In Appendix Section C.2 we also report
CDFs of subject-level average behavior.
14
(1) (2)
Entry Effort
Effort Cost = 6 0.00 -10.51∗∗∗
(0.00) (2.21)
Effort Cost = 9 -0.01 -18.38∗∗∗
(0.01) (3.69)
Effort Cost = 12 -0.06∗∗ -39.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (4.11)
Effort Cost = 15 -0.22∗∗∗ -52.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (4.31)
High (Fixed Cost = 350) 0.00 -27.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (3.67)
Effort Cost = 6 × High -0.01 7.13∗∗
(0.01) (2.17)
Effort Cost = 9 × High -0.04 18.20∗∗∗
(0.02) (4.39)
Effort Cost = 12 × High -0.29∗∗∗ 23.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (5.17)
Effort Cost = 15 × High -0.34∗∗∗ 32.06∗∗∗
(0.05) (5.16)
Intercept (Effort Cost = 3) 0.99∗∗∗ 85.39∗∗∗
(0.00) (2.96)
Observations 3600 3127
R-sq 0.288 0.262
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 3: Fixed effects regressions of entry and effort decisions by treatment and effort cost, under
full information and random matching.
A Wald test rejects the joint test of the null hypothesis that all observed entry probabilities are equal to
their theoretical values (p-value< 0.001). As noted above, there is “too little" entry relative to the theory
in the Low treatment (at locations with high effort costs) and “too much" in the High treatment. Note
that the test is quite stringent, since the predicted entry rate is 100% in all but two cases (such boundary
predictions are easy to reject). However, as predicted, there is less entry in the High treatment than in
the Low treatment. Moreover, the data are consistent with the comparative statics of the model, as we
observe negative and significant coefficients of the High cost treatment only for the two highest-effort-
cost locations. Thus the data support the following finding:
Finding 1: The extent of territory depends on the fixed cost of conflict entry and effort, as predicted,
with clearly defined territory emerging more often in the High treatment than in the Low.
Figure 5 displays the distribution of conflict effort, conditional on entry, at each battlefield, over the fi-
nal 5 periods of each treatment. The equilibrium efforts from Table 1 are displayed as red bars dotted
15
with asterisks. In general, the sample median tracks the equilibrium effort at each battlefield reasonably
closely, and the equilibrium effort falls within the sample interquartile range in 9 out of 10 cases.
We provide statistical support for this finding via fixed effects regression analysis of individual conflict
expenditures at each battlefield, and we cluster standard errors at the subject level. The dependent vari-
able is the subject’s conflict effort at a given location, and the independent variables include dummies
for the marginal cost of conflict at the location, a High fixed cost treatment dummy, and the full set of
interactions. The intercept captures the conflict expenditures at the location with marginal cost of conflict
= 3 in the Low fixed cost treatment. We use data from the final 5 periods of each treatment, so our sample
consists of 72 subjects, each of whom makes up to 5 effort decisions (one for each location) in each of
10 periods (5 per treatment). Estimates are reported in column (2) of Table 3.
A Wald test rejects the joint test of the null hypothesis that all conflict efforts equal their theoretical point
predictions (p-value < 0.001). Overall, we observe significant differences (i.e. Wald test p-values <
0.05) between observed mean effort expenditures and theoretical predictions in 5 out of the 10 fixed cost
× marginal cost combinations; 4 of the 5 reveal significantly higher expenditures, and 1 of the 5 reveals
significantly lower expenditures than predicted. Nevertheless, the data are again broadly consistent with
the comparative static predictions of the theory. For instance, effort expenditures are declining in ef-
fort costs within the Low fixed cost treatment, as expected. Similarly, effort expenditures are initially
(weakly) increasing and then decreasing in effort costs in the High fixed cost treatment.
Finding 2: Conflict efforts are broadly consistent with the equilibrium comparative statics, with slight
deviations from theoretical point predictions in the direction of excess conflict expenditure.
In the aggregate, the data from the Low and High treatments provide reasonably strong support for
the theoretical predictions, when we observe subjects under conditions analogous to those under which
the theory was derived (i.e. full information about own and other conflict capabilities and one-shot
interaction, as induced via random matching).
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Figure 5: Boxplots of conflict efforts, by treatment and effort cost under complete information and
random matching. Non-entry is coded as missing data. Thick black bars indicate sample medians, and the boxes bound
the interquartile range.
4.2 Entry and Effort under Knightian Uncertainty and Partner Matching
Figure 6 is directly analogous to Figure 4 and displays conflict entry probabilities by treatment for each
battlefield over the final 5 periods of each treatment condition. Observed entry behavior under uncertainty
about the contest success function is strikingly similar to that observed under complete information. On
the whole we see too little entry, relative to the predictions, but the data again broadly confirm the theory.
Entry rates are decreasing in the marginal cost of conflict effort, and we see clear evidence that entry is
less likely in the High fixed cost treatment, primarily when effort costs are also high. Note that this is
true despite subjects’ radical uncertainty about the contest success function, which renders computation
of best responses virtually impossible, and despite the partner matching protocol, which could have fa-
cilitated widespread cooperation via repeat interaction.
We provide statistical support for the foregoing observations via linear probability estimates with subject
fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the pair level.16 As above the treatment effects
are identified from within-subject variation. The dependent variable measures entry decisions. It takes
a value of 1 if a subject chose to enter conflict at a given location and 0 otherwise. The independent
variables include dummies for the marginal cost of conflict at the location, a High fixed cost treatment
dummy, and the full set of interactions. The intercept captures the entry probability at the location with
marginal cost of conflict = 3 in the Low fixed cost treatment. We use data from the final 5 periods of
16Results are qualitatively unchanged if we instead cluster standard errors at the session level and compute them via
bootstrap.
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Figure 6: Probability of conflict entry, by treatment and effort cost under Knightian uncertainty
and partner matching.
each treatment, so our sample consists of 72 subjects, each of whom makes 5 entry decisions (one for
each location) in each of 10 periods (5 per treatment). Estimates are reported in column (1) of Table 4.
A Wald test rejects the joint test of the null hypothesis that all observed entry probabilities are equal to
their theoretical values (p-value < 0.001), but nevertheless the treatment effect of High fixed costs is
negative and both economically and statistically significant when marginal costs are high. Next we turn
to subjects’ effort decisions, conditional on entry.
Figure 7 displays the distribution of conflict effort, conditional on entry, at each battlefield, with non-
entry coded as missing data over the final 5 periods of each treatment. As in the treatment with full
information, we see that the sample median conflict expenditures are quite close to the equilibrium pre-
dictions, with the equilibrium effort always within the sample interquartile range.
As before, we report fixed effects regression analysis of individual conflict expenditures at each bat-
tlefield, and we cluster standard errors at the pair level. The dependent variable is the subject’s conflict
effort at a given location, and the independent variables include dummies for the marginal cost of conflict
at the location, a High fixed cost treatment dummy, and the full set of interactions. The intercept captures
the conflict expenditures at the location with marginal cost of conflict = 3 in the Low fixed cost treatment.
We use data from the final 5 periods of each treatment, so our sample consists of 72 subjects, each of
whom makes up to 5 effort decisions (one for each location) in each of 10 periods (5 per treatment).
Estimates are reported in column (2) of Table 4.
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(1) (2)
Entry Effort
Effort Cost = 6 -0.00 -6.81∗∗
(0.00) (2.36)
Effort Cost = 9 -0.01 -5.45
(0.00) (5.08)
Effort Cost = 12 -0.18∗∗∗ -25.73∗∗∗
(0.05) (5.43)
Effort Cost = 15 -0.24∗∗∗ -35.53∗∗∗
(0.05) (5.58)
High (Fixed Cost = 350) 0.00 -13.12∗
(0.01) (6.41)
Effort Cost = 6 × High -0.01 2.42
(0.01) (3.21)
Effort Cost = 9 × High -0.04∗ 7.97
(0.02) (6.96)
Effort Cost = 12 × High -0.23∗∗∗ 12.53
(0.06) (6.49)
Effort Cost = 15 × High -0.27∗∗∗ 12.56∗
(0.06) (6.11)
Intercept (Effort Cost = 3) 0.99∗∗∗ 68.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (5.02)
Observations 3600 3051
R-sq 0.251 0.101
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4: Fixed effects regressions of entry and effort decisions by treatment and effort cost, under
Knightian uncertainty and partner matching.
A Wald test rejects the joint test of the null hypothesis that all conflict efforts equal their theoretical point
predictions (p-value < 0.001). Overall, we observe significant differences (i.e. Wald test p-values <
0.05) between observed mean effort expenditures and theoretical predictions in 4 out of the 10 fixed cost
× marginal cost combinations; 2 of the 4 reveal significantly higher expenditures, and 2 of the 4 reveal
significantly lower expenditures than predicted. Nevertheless, the data are again broadly consistent with
the comparative static predictions of the theory. Effort expenditures are declining in effort costs in the
Low fixed cost treatment, and expenditures are initially (weakly) increasing and then decreasing in effort
costs in the High fixed cost treatment. This leads us to our third finding:
Finding 3: Entry and effort decisions under Knightian uncertainty and repeat interaction are reasonably
consistent with the equilibrium of the underlying (unknown) game, suggesting that the incentive effects
of entry and effort costs guide conflict decisions toward equilibrium.
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Figure 7: Boxplots of conflict efforts, by treatment and effort cost under Knightian uncertainty and
partner matching. Non-entry is coded as missing data. Thick black bars indicate sample medians, and the boxes bound
the interquartile range.
4.3 The Effect of Uncertainty and Partner Matching
Since we did not vary the presence of Knightian uncertainty or the matching protocol within-subject, our
identification of the (joint) effect of these treatment variables comes from between-subject variation. We
estimate two random effects regressions of entry and effort decisions at each location, including dum-
mies for the fixed cost, marginal cost, and presence of complete information (and random matching) and
the full set of interactions. We include random effects for each subject to control for repeat observation
and we compute bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the session level (to account for the small
number of sessions). We use data from the final 5 periods of each treatment, so our sample consists of
144 subjects, each of whom makes up to 5 effort decisions (one for each location) in each of 10 periods
(5 per treatment). Full estimates are available upon request.
Overall, we find very little evidence for treatment differences in conflict entry or conflict expenditure
between the Full-Info/Random Matching and Knightian/Partner Matching treatments. Only one of the
coefficients capturing the effect of the Knightian/Partner Matching treatment is statistically significant at
the 5% level in either model (out of 20 coefficients). This coheres with the visual evidence presented in
the figures above and provides further support for the claim that subject behavior in our model of terri-
tory is shaped by the incentives for entry and effort induced by the cost structure. While some readers
may find it surprising that repeat matching did not induce more (attempts at) cooperation, one design
feature that was constant across treatments was that subjects were paid based on the outcome of a sin-
gle randomly chosen period of the game. This incentive scheme likely reduces incentives to cooperate
(e.g. by alternating who claims the resource in each period). The evidence from previous studies on the
20
impact of partner matching in conflict games is mixed. Chowdhury et al. (2013) find limited effects in re-
peated two-player Blotto games, but Baik et al. (2016) find evidence of reduced expenditure in repeated
two-player Tullock contests. In our setting, we cannot rule out the possibility that the joint effect of
introducing Knightian uncertainty and partner matching is zero, while the independent effects of either
variation are equal and in opposite directions, but we view this as unlikely.
Finding 4: Subject behavior does not vary significantly with the presence of Knightian uncertainty and
partner matching (i.e. under conditions that more nearly reflect conflict settings outside the lab)
5 Conclusion
We provide theory and experimental evidence that the presence and scope of territorial monopoly de-
pends on economies of scale in the production of violence and the costs associated with the projection
of violence at a distance. Our theory provides a microfoundation and extension of Boulding’s “Loss of
Strength Gradient" to predict the intensive and extensive margins of territorial conflict across multiple
locations. A direct test of the theory in the laboratory provides evidence that conflict behavior and the
consequent distribution of territory is broadly consistent with the model. Probing the boundaries of the
theory with additional experiments, we then show that the theory capably predicts subjects’ behavior
even when they face Knightian uncertainty about the underlying game of conflict and when they interact
repeatedly with the same opponents. This extension suggests that conflict behavior - hence the scope of
territory - responds strongly to underlying incentives also under conditions that parallel those faced by
conflict actors outside the lab.
Taken together, our theory and experiment provide a starting point for further research on the factors
determining the extent and distribution of territory. Both the theoretical framework and the experimental
platform can be readily extended to study the impact on territory of more complex and realistic geogra-
phies (see the Appendix for one such extension), different technologies of conflict, larger N, and so on.
In addition to elaborations within the framework developed here, other extensions to the model would
potentially consider dynamic processes through which territory is created and shrinks or expands over
time. For instance, in the current paper, although we conceive of territory as an equilibrium outcome
rather than an exogenous constraint, we still assume the home “base" for each party is fixed, when in
reality the location may to some extent be a choice variable. We hope that this work inspires others to
explore some of these issues.
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Appendices to Adamson and Kimbrough (2018)
A Additional Theoretical Results
A.1 Macro Behavior
Combining the microeconomics of conflict with geographic variation in costs leads to some powerful
predictions about territory at the macro level. Figure 8 depicts two players competing at each location
along a continuum. Cost curves, ci(`),K, are drawn as dashed lines and the variable returns, Pi(`)Y −
ci(`)ei(`), are drawn as solid lines for interior Nash equilibrium. When there is exit, the profit lines have
more of an S−shape as the cost-advantaged player earns more when the other exits. The region LKRK is
the region where both players have a pure strategy to enter and expend effort. We call this the critical
boundary, and its size depends on the costs of entry as well as the spatial gradient of effort costs of both
players.17
Figure 8: Territories for 2 Players
(a) Effort Costs
L R
cL(`)
cR(`)
(b) Profits
L R
K
PL(`)Y − cL(`)eL(`)
PR(`)Y − cR(`)eR(`)
LKRK
This macro picture is useful because it provides intuitive statics even when the contest success functions
aren’t explicitly specified. So while Tullock contests have equilibrium variable returns that decrease with
distance, this is a plausibly general claim.18 This macro picture lets us consider one important extension
17This answers calls by (Boulding, 1962, p.265) that “we need to develop a concept of a critical boundary, which may be
the same as the legal boundary but which may lie either inside it or outside it”.
18Any monotone decreasing profit functions (in Nash EQ) will create the same qualitative picture. Holding all efforts at a
single value, the variable returns decrease with distance simply because the unit costs are increasing with distance. In partial
equilibrium, efforts will be adjusted so that less effort will be expended to the higher cost locations, and this will amplify the
downward slope. However, non-monotonicities in costs can create multiple regions of conflict. Likewise, neither common
and constant fixed costs nor common and constant prize values are requisite, but adding heterogeneity to these variables will
change the equilibrium region of conflict.
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that is nearly intractable at the micro level: the case in which the resource can be destroyed by conflict.
Empirical observation suggests border violence is more likely with natural resources close by (Caselli
et al., 2015). This is a special case when Y does not depend on e. But if the resource can be destroyed by
fighting, then there is an additional cost when both players enter and expend effort. When the resource
is elastic, the mutual conflict line PiY − ciei shifts downwards when there are two entrants. This acts as
an extra entry deterrent for cost-disadvantaged players. As a consequence, the area of conflict shrinks.
In a world of natural resources, an increasing value of land (or declining costs) leads to larger political
territories and larger regions of conflict. But in a world where the value of land is increasingly produced,
the political territories grow larger and more exclusive. This matches the time series of maps in many
historical epochs: going from small separated entities to regional empires with border wars to exclusive
territories (Branch, 2014).
A.2 Uniqueness
Note that the system of equations described by 8 implies that for a given location
0 1 1 ... 1
1 0 1 ... 1
... 1
1 1 1 ... 0


e1
e2
...
en
 =

c1
c2
...
cn

(
n−1
n
)2 Y
c2
Then for the identity matrix In and vector 1n, the Sherwin-Morrison Formula yields
(−In +1n1Tn )−1 = −In−
−In1n1Tn In
1−1Tn In1n
(15)
which implies the unique equilibrium solution
e =
n−1
n2
Y
c2

−n+2 1 1 ... 1
1 −n+2 1 ... 1
... 1
1 1 1 ... −n+2
c (16)
A.3 Effort Example for 3 Players on 2 Dimensions
Consider a numerical example that shows the effect of a change in the spatial gradient of costs on the
effort surface. Let Y = 1E7 and there be no fixed costs. Figure A1 shows the distribution of efforts for
each player on a 100×100 grid.
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Figure A1
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B Experiment Instructions
B.1 Instructions for the High treatment
Introduction
This is an experiment on economic decision-making. If you read the instructons carefully and make 
good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in CASH at the 
end of the experiment. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other partcipant. If you have any 
questons, raise your hand, and the experimenterssa will answer them privately. You must also put away 
all materials unrelated to the experiment, including cell-phones, tablets, and pen-and-paper.
If you do not follow these instructons you will be excluded from the experiment and paid only the 
show-up payment of $7. 
Experimental decisions will involve Experimental Currency Units sECUa. At the end of the experiment, 
ECU will be converted to dollars at a rate of 200 ECU = $1.
Your Task
You have been assigned a role as either a “Person L” or a “Person R”. In each period of this experiment, 
you will be randomly paired with another person of the opposite role. You will each decide whether to 
compete for valuable resources at fve diferent locatons  1, 2,  ,  ,  }. Person L is based at locaton 1, 
and Person R is based at locaton  .
At each locaton, there is a resource worth 2000 ECU. For each locaton, you will choose whether to pay 
a cost to enter a competton for the resource at that locaton, and if you enter, you will choose how 
much costly effort to expend in the competton. Depending on your entry/efort decision at a given 
locaton and the entry/efort decision of the other person, you will each receive some, all, or none of the
resource. Note that you and the other person will make your decisions simultaneously so that you will 
not know the other person’s decision when making your own.
The cost of competng at a locaton has two components. 
s1a The frst component is the “Entry Cost”. This is the cost of entering the competton for the 
resource at a given locaton. You pay this cost if you choose to enter at that locaton at all. In 
this experiment the Entry Cost is   0 ECU at each locaton. 
s2a The second component is the “Effort Cost”. This is the cost sin ECUa per unit of efort you 
expend in the competton. The table below shows the costs for each person’s efort at each 
locaton. Notce that the cost is not the same in all locatons, and in partcular the cost per unit 
of efort is higher for locatons that are further away from the locaton at which a person is 
based. For example, for Person L, the Effort Cost is   ECU per unit at locaton 1 swhere Person L 
is baseda and rises up to 1  ECU per unit at locaton   sthe furthest locaton from where Person L
is baseda. You may input up to 110 units of efort at each locaton.
In the experiment, you will always be either person L or person R. Your task is to decide at which 
locations you want to compete, and how much efort you want to expend at each location.
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Location Effort Cost Person L
sECUa
Effort Cost Person s 
sECUa
1
sPerson La
 1 
2 6 12
3 9 9
4 12 6
5
sPerson Ra
1  
The sules of Competition
There are a total of   compettons, one at each locaton, and the outcome of each competton is 
independent of the outcome of the other compettons. Each Person will receive some, all or none of the
2000 ECU resource at each locaton. Your payof in a period is the sum of your payofs from all   
locatons.
There are three possible scenarios for the competton at each locaton, and these scenarios depend on 
the entry and efort decisions of both people.
s1a If no one enters the competton at a locaton, no one receives the resource at that locaton, and
no one pays any costs. Both people earn $0 at that locaton.
s2a If only one person enters the competton at a locaton, the person who enters receives the 
entre resource sworth 2000 ECUa and pays both the Entry Cost and the Efort Cost. The other 
person earns 0 ECU at that locaton.
s a If both people enter the competton at a locaton, payofs are determined as follows. Each unit 
of efort by Person L increases the share of the resource that Person L receives in the 
competton. Each unit of efort by Person R increases the share that Person R receives in the 
competton. Specifcally, your share of the resource is equal to:
My Effort
Their Effort+My Effort . Note 
that both Person L and Person s must pay their Entry and Efort Costs, and note that if your 
costs are higher than the value of the resource you receive, your payof from that locaton will 
be negatve. Note, if both people enter the competton and both choose an efort of 0, the 
resource will be divided equally, with both people paying only the Entry Cost.
To help you make informed decisions, the experiment interface allows you to simulate the 
payofs you would receive for various choices of your efort and the other person’s efort at 
each locaton. The screenshot below shows the simulator interface. The colored panel scalled a 
heatmapa uses color to show the payof that would result from various choices by you and the 
other person. Red colors indicate combinatons of actons that would lead to high payofs, and 
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blue colors indicate combinatons of actons that would lead to low snegatvea payofs ssee the 
scale on the righta. 
Example 
To clarify, we provide a hypothetcal example of the outcome of competton at all   locatons.
s1a Suppose only Person L enters the competton at locaton 1 and spends 0 units of efort. Person L
will pay the Entry Cost s  0 ECUa, but will not have to pay any Effort Cost. Person L will then 
receive the resource sworth 2000 ECUa, and so will earn 16 0 ECU. Person R will receive 0 ECU.
s2a Suppose only Person L enters the competton at locaton 2 and spends 10 units of efort. Person
L will pay the Entry Cost s  0 ECUa, and will also pay the Effort Cost s6 x 10 = 60 ECUa. Person L 
will then receive the resource worth s2000 ECUa and so will earn 1 90 ECU. Person R will receive
0 ECU.
s a Suppose neither Person L nor Person R enters the competton at locaton  . Both people will 
receive 0 ECU, and no one will receive the resource.
s a Suppose both Person L and Person R enter the competton at locaton  , and suppose Person L 
puts in  0 units of efort and Person R puts in 10 units of efort. 
The total cost paid by Person L at locaton   is equal to the Entry Cost s  0 ECUa plus the Effort 
Cost s12 x  0 Units =  60 ECUa.
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The total cost paid by Person R at locaton   is equal to the Entry Cost s  0 ECUa plus the Effort 
Cost s6 x 10 Units = 60 ECUa.
Person L would get  0/s 0+10a = ¾ of the resource sor 1 00 ECUa. Subtractng the costs of entry 
and efort, Person L would then receive 1 00 -   0 -  60 = 790 ECU. 
Person R would get 10/s10+ 0a = ¼ of the resource sor  00 ECUa. Subtractng the costs of entry 
and efort, Person R would then receive  00 -   0 - 60 = 90 ECU.
s a Suppose both Person L and Person R enter the competton at locaton   and both spend 0 units 
of efort. Both Person L and Person R will pay the Entry Cost s  0 ECU eacha, and both will pay 
zero additonal Effort Cost. They will each receive half of the resource value s1000 ECUa, which 
after subtractng the costs leave each with a total of 6 0 ECU.
Both peoples’ total earnings for the period are the sum of their earnings from all fve locatons:
Location Earnings Person L Earnings Person s
1 16 0 0
2 1 90 0
3 0 0
4 790 90
5 6 0 6 0
Total = 1+2+3+4+5  680 ECU 7 0 ECU
Additional Information
In this experiment, we will repeat this task for  2 repettons, called periods. Each period lasts a total of 
2 minutes and  0 seconds.  Note that a tmer is displayed  on the top right corner of your screen and will
update every 10 seconds.  At the start of each period, you will be matched with a randomly chosen 
person of the other type. You will then have 2 minutes and 20 seconds to make your choices. If you 
haven’t submited your choice by that tme, then your current values will be recorded. The period will 
then end and display the choices and earnings of you and your compettor at each locaton. This will 
repeat for 16 periods, at which point the experiment will pause and you will receive further instructon. 
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly choose one period as your experiment earnings. 
All partcipants in the experiment receive an inital endowment of 2000 ECU. Your experiment earnings 
will consist of this endowment, plus or minus your earnings from the randomly chosen period. We will 
convert these ECU to dollars at a rate of 200 ECU = $1. We will add this to your showup payment of $7.
Before beginning the experiment, we will do two practce periods. For the frst practce period, we will 
guide you through your decisions to show you how the interface works. The second period will be a live 
practce round where you can explore the interface on your own. Note that these two periods cannot be
chosen for payment. When the two periods are fnished, please wait for instructons. Are there any 
questons?
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B.2 Script for the High treatment
1 Tutorial
Before you make any decisions, we will walk you through the interface and ensure that you understand
how to make choices in this experiment.
Please click the “Initialize” button to begin the tutorial.
At the top left of your screen, you will see a statement indicating whether you are Person L or Person R.
Below that information is a table showing how your payoff is determined at each location, depending on
whether you choose to enter the competition or not. No matter what, if you choose not to enter, your
payoff is 0. If you Enter, your payoff depends on your effort decision and the entry/effort decision of
your counterpart.
Below this table is where you will make your choices. For each location, you can see the effort cost at
that location. Location 1 is displayed at the top, and location 5 is displayed at the bottom.
Slider Example
Please check the Enter box under Loc 1. Notice that your Total Cost (shown to the right) jumps to 350
ECU. This is the cost you would incur if you Enter at location 1. By adjusting the slider, you can choose
how much effort cost to incur. Your total cost will also adjust in real time as you move the slider. For
example, move the slider to 54. Your cost is then 350+54×Your Effort Cost at Loc 1 (which is 3 if you
are a Person L and 15 if you are a Person R).
Simulator Tabs
The Simulator tabs on the right allow you to see how your payoff at each location would vary depending
on the choices made by you and your counterpart. For now, look at the payoff heatmap for Loc 1. Sup-
pose your counterpart chose an effort of 40, you can find your payoff for various efforts by finding the
40 on the x-axis and tracing upward on the screen. Warmer colors (red, orange, yellow) are associated
with higher payoffs.
Please take 2 minutes to look at this information for each location. When you are finished looking, please
make entry and effort decisions for all 5 locations. Click “Submit” when you are finished. Remember
this is a practice period and will not be chosen for payment. If you have any questions please raise your
hand and a monitor will assist you.
Period Summary
Now that everyone has hit submit, the “Last Period Summary” screen has appeared. This shows you the
outcome of your decisions at each location, including your effort and your counterpart’s effort and both
people’s earnings. If a person chose not to enter, their Effort will be listed as N/A. After 10 seconds, this
will disappear and the next period will begin.
1
34
History Tabs
A record of all your previous decisions and outcomes, as well as your counterparts, will be shown on the
“History” tab.
2 Practice Round
This is the beginning of your practice period. Please make your choices on your own. Note that the
Seconds Remaining in the period is shown on the top-right and will be updated every 10 seconds.
3 Begin Game
This is the beginning of the Periods for which you may be paid.
4 Switchover Instructions
Please remove your hands from the computer mice and keyboards. We have now completed 16 periods
and will take a short break before continuing.
After the break, we will now restart the experiment for 16 more periods with the same rules as before.
The only change is that the Entry Cost has changed from 350 ECU to 10 ECU. We will choose only one
of these 32 periods for payment at the end. During the break, take a minute to think about how well your
strategy worked and how you will continue.
[wait 2 mins]
We will continue the game shortly. Before everyone makes their choices, I want to talk you through the
new simulators. Please click the “Continue Game” button on your browser.
Everyone click “Sim 3”, these are your new payoffs at that location.
Everyone click the Simulator Tab for their base location to see your new payoff schedule there.
Everyone click the Simulator Tab for the location furthest from their base.
The experiment has begun again and you may now make your choices.
5 Game Completion
The game is now complete. Please fill out this short-survey.
Once everyone has completed the survey, a monitor will direct you to submit your surveys and will then
call you for payment.
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B.3 Instructions for the Uncertain-High treatment
Introduction
This is an experiment on economic decision-making. If you read the instructons carefully and make 
good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in CASH at the 
end of the experiment. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other partcipant. If you have any 
questons, raise your hand, and the experimenterssa will answer them privately. You must also put away 
all materials unrelated to the experiment, including cell-phones, tablets, and pen-and-paper.
If you do not follow these instructons you will be excluded from the experiment and paid only the 
show-up payment of $7. 
Experimental decisions will involve Experimental Currency Units sECUa. At the end of the experiment, 
ECU will be converted to dollars at a rate of 200 ECU = $1.
Your Task
You have been assigned a role as either a “Person L” or a “Person R”. In each period of this experiment, 
you will be randomly paired with another person of the opposite role. You will each decide whether to 
compete for valuable resources at fve diferent locatons  1, 2,  ,  ,  }. Person L is based at locaton 1, 
and Person R is based at locaton  .
At each locaton, there is a resource worth 2000 ECU. For each locaton, you will choose whether to pay 
a cost to enter a competton for the resource at that locaton, and if you enter, you will choose how 
much costly effort to expend in the competton. Depending on your entry/efort decision at a given 
locaton and the entry/efort decision of the other person, you will each receive some, all, or none of the
resource. Note that you and the other person will make your decisions simultaneously so that you will 
not know the other person’s decision when making your own.
The cost of competng at a locaton has two components. 
s1a The frst component is the “Entry Cost”. This is the cost of entering the competton for the 
resource at a given locaton. You pay this cost if you choose to enter at that locaton at all. 
s2a The second component is the “Effort Cost”. This is the cost sin ECUa per unit of efort you 
expend in the competton. The table below shows the costs for each person’s efort at each 
locaton. Notce that the cost is not the same in all locatons, and in partcular the cost per unit 
of efort is higher for locatons that are further away from the locaton at which a person is 
based.  You may input up to 110 units of efort at each locaton.
In the experiment, you will always be either person L or person R. Your task is to decide at which 
locations you want to compete, and how much efort you want to expend at each location.
The Rules of Competition
There are a total of   compettons, one at each locaton, and the outcome of each competton is 
independent of the outcome of the other compettons. Each Person will receive some, all or none of the
2000 ECU resource at each locaton. Your payof in a period is the sum of your payofs from all   
locatons.
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There are three possible scenarios for the competton at each locaton, and these scenarios depend on 
the entry and efort decisions of both people.
s1a If no one enters the competton at a locaton, no one receives the resource at that locaton, and
no one pays any costs. Both people earn 0 at that locaton.
s2a If only one person enters the competton at a locaton, the person who enters receives the 
entre resource sworth 2000 ECUa and pays both the Entry Cost and the Efort Cost. The other 
person earns 0 ECU at that locaton.
s a If both people enter the competton at a locaton, payofs are determined as follows. Each unit 
of efort by Person L increases the share of the resource that Person L receives in the 
competton. Each unit of efort by Person R increases the share that Person R receives in the 
competton.  Note that both Person L and Person R must pay their Entry and Efort Costs, and 
note that if your costs are higher than the value of the resource you receive, your payof from 
that locaton will be negatve.
Example 
To clarify, we provide a hypothetcal example of the outcome of competton at all   locatons.
s1a Suppose only Person L enters the competton at locaton 1 and spends 0 units of efort. Person L
will pay the Entry Cost, but will not have to pay any Effort Cost. Person L will then receive the 
resource sworth 2000 ECUa. So 
Person L will earn 2000-EntryCost_L
Person R will receive 0 ECU.
s2a Suppose only Person L enters the competton at locaton 2 and spends 10 units of efort. Person
L will pay the Entry Cost, and will also pay the Effort Cost. Person L will then receive the 
resource worth s2000 ECUa. So 
Person L will earn 2000-EntryCost_L-EfortCost_L .
Person R will receive 0 ECU.
s a Suppose neither Person L nor Person R enters the competton at locaton  . Both people will 
receive 0 ECU, and no one will receive the resource.
s a Suppose both Person L and Person R enter the competton at locaton  , and suppose Person L 
puts in  0 units of efort and Person R puts in 10 units of efort. Since both Person L and Person 
R chose to enter the competton, each receives a share of the resource.
Person L will earn 2000*Share_L –  EntryCost_L-EfortCost_L
Person R will earn 2000*Share_R -  EntryCost_R-EfortCost_R
s a Suppose both Person L and Person R enter the competton at locaton   and both spend 0 units 
of efort. Both Person L and Person R will pay only the Entry Cost. They will each receive a share 
of the resource.
Person L will earn 2000*Share_L –  EntryCost_L
Person R will earn 2000*Share_R -  EntryCost_R
Both peoples’ total earnings for the period are the sum of their earnings from all fve locatons.
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Additional Information
In this experiment, we will repeat this task for  2 repettons, called periods. Each period lasts a total of 
2 minutes and  0 seconds.  Note that a tmer is displayed  on the top right corner of your screen and will
update every 10 seconds.  At the start of each period, you will be matched with a randomly chosen 
person of the other type. You will then have 2 minutes and 20 seconds to make your choices. If you 
haven’t submited your choice by that tme, then your current values will be recorded. The period will 
then end and display the choices and earnings of you and your compettor at each locaton. This will 
repeat for 16 periods, at which point the experiment will pause and you will receive further instructon. 
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly choose one period as your experiment earnings. 
All partcipants in the experiment receive an inital endowment of 2000 ECU. Your experiment earnings 
will consist of this endowment, plus or minus your earnings from the randomly chosen period. We will 
convert these ECU to dollars at a rate of 200 ECU = $1. We will add this to your showup payment of $7.
Before beginning the experiment, we will do two practce periods. For the frst practce period, we will 
guide you through your decisions to show you how the interface works. The second period will be a live 
practce round where you can explore the interface on your own. Note that these two periods cannot be
chosen for payment. When the two periods are fnished, please wait for instructons. Are there any 
questons?
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B.4 Script for the Uncertain-High treatment
1 Tutorial
Before you make any decisions, we will walk you through the interface and ensure that you understand
how to make choices in this experiment.
Please click the “Initialize” button to begin the tutorial.
At the top left of your screen, you will see a statement indicating whether you are Person L or Person R.
Below that information is a table showing how your payoff is determined at each location, depending on
whether you choose to enter the competition or not. No matter what, if you choose not to enter, your
payoff is 0. If you Enter, your payoff depends on your effort decision and the entry/effort decision of
your counterpart.
Below this table is where you will make your choices. For each location, you can see the effort cost at
that location. Location 1 is displayed at the top, and location 5 is displayed at the bottom.
Slider Example
Please check the Enter box under Loc 1. Notice that your Total Cost (shown to the right) jumps. This is
the cost you would incur if you Enter at location 1. By adjusting the slider, you can choose how much
effort cost to incur. Your total cost will also adjust in real time as you move the slider. For example,
move the slider to 54. Your cost is then your EntryCost +54× EffortCost at Loc 1.
Please take 2 minutes to look at this information for each location. When you are finished looking, please
make entry and effort decisions for all 5 locations. Click “Submit” when you are finished. Remember
this is a practice period and will not be chosen for payment. If you have any questions please raise your
hand and a monitor will assist you.
Period Summary
Now that everyone has hit submit, the “Last Period Summary” screen has appeared. This shows you the
outcome of your decisions at each location, including your effort and your counterpart’s effort and both
people’s earnings. If a person chose not to enter, their Effort will be listed as N/A. After 10 seconds, this
will disappear and the next period will begin.
History Tabs
A record of all your previous decisions and outcomes, as well as your counterparts, will be shown on the
“History” tab.
2 Practice Round
This is the beginning of your practice period. Please make your choices on your own. Note that the
Seconds Remaining in the period is shown on the top-right and will be updated every 10 seconds.
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3 Begin Game
This is the beginning of the Periods for which you may be paid.
4 Switchover Instructions
Please remove your hands from the computer mice and keyboards. We have now completed 16 periods
and will take a short break before continuing.
After the break, we will now restart the experiment for 16 more periods with the same rules as before.
The only change is that the Entry Cost has changed. We will choose only one of these 32 periods for
payment at the end. During the break, take a minute to think about how well your strategy worked and
how you will continue.
[wait 2 mins]
Please click the “Continue Game” button on your browser.
The experiment has begun again and you may now make your choices.
5 Game Completion
The game is now complete. Please fill out this short-survey.
Once everyone has completed the survey, a monitor will direct you to submit your surveys and will then
call you for payment.
2
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C Additional Data Analysis and Figures
C.1 Effort Distribution over all Periods
Empirical conflict scholarship has emphasized the importance at looking at more than just the mean, in
particular thinking about war and peace as tail events. While modern statesmen are concerned about the
onset of war and worst-case scenerios, even Livy stated “the outcome corresponds less to expectations in
war than in any other case whatsoever”. The boxplots shown in Figures 4 and 5 summarize efforts, but
further insights can be gleaned from analyzing the entire distribution. Figure C1 shows a histogram of
efforts with unit length bins for each treatment at each location. The left-most bar, plotted in red indicates
the proportion of subjects that chose not to enter the conflict. While there is much heterogeneity, with
some observations at nearly every effort level in every location, there are noticeable cost-effects. For
locations that are close to the base (effort costs 3 or 6), the biggest effect of high fixed costs are to pull
expenditures away from the maximum allowed. For locations that are close to the base (effort costs 12
or 15), the biggest effect of high fixed costs is to cause exit. In summary, the combination of fixed &
marginal costs have big effects on the maximum and the minimum effort in addition to big effects on
mean effort.
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Figure C1: Effort Histograms, by block, by treatment and effort cost.The red bar indicates the proportion
of decisions that involved choosing not to enter the conflict.
C.2 Individual Level Analysis
In practice, the aggregate observations reported in the body of the paper mask considerable heterogeneity
across subjects. To capture this heterogeneity, we compute subject level means of entry probability and
effort expenditure, conditional on entry for each marginal cost of effort under Low and High fixed costs.
Figure C2 displays empirical CDFs of these subject level means.
In terms of entry decisions, we see that most subjects always enter conflict when the marginal cost of
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effort is 9 or less. However, when the marginal cost is high, we observe striking variation in subject-level
entry rates. In terms of average effort, conditional on entry, there is striking heterogeneity regardless
of the marginal cost of conflict. Explanations for the fact that the average of the subject-level averages
tracks the theory reasonably closely, despite the rarity of individual subjects behaving consistently with
the theory are beyond the scope of this paper, but perhaps this is a fruitful direction for future research
which might seek to understand individual variation in the degree of “territoriality".
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Figure C2: Empirical CDFs of mean entry probability and effort expenditure, by subject, treatment
and the marginal cost of effort at the location. Non-entry is coded as missing data in computing effort means.
43
